Why Aquinas says that Fornication is a Mortal sin

Without any doubt we must hold simple fornication to be a mortal sin, notwithstanding that a gloss [St. Augustine, QQ. in Deut., qu. 37 on Deuteronomy 23:17, says: "This is a prohibition against going with whores, whose vileness is venial." For instead of "venial" it should be "venal," since such is the wanton's trade. On order to make this evident, we must take note that every sin committed directly against human life is a mortal sin. Now simple fornication implies an inordinateness that tends to injure the life of the offspring to be born of this union. For we find in all animals where the upbringing of the offspring needs care of both male and female, that these come together not indeterminately, but the male with a certain female, whether one or several; such is the case with all birds: while, on the other hand, among those animals, where the female alone suffices for the offspring's upbringing, the union is indeterminate, as in the case of dogs and like animals. Now it is evident that the upbringing of a human child requires not only the mother's care for his nourishment, but much more the care of his father as guide and guardian, and under whom he progresses in goods both internal and external. Hence human nature rebels against an indeterminate union of the sexes and demands that a man should be united to a determinate woman and should abide with her a long time or even for a whole lifetime. Hence it is that in the human race the male has a natural solicitude for the certainty of offspring, because on him devolves the upbringing of the child: and this certainly would cease if the union of sexes were indeterminate.

This union with a certain definite woman is called matrimony; which for the above reason is said to belong to the natural law. Since, however, the union of the sexes is directed to the common good of the whole human race, and commongoods depend on the law for their determination, as stated above (I-II, 90, 2), it follows that this union of man andwoman, which is called matrimony, is determined by some law. What this determination is for us will be stated in the Third Part of this work (Supplement,050, seqq.), where we shall treat of the sacrament of matrimony. Wherefore, since fornication is an indeterminate union of the sexes, as something incompatible with matrimony, it is opposed to the goodof the child's upbringing, and consequently it is a mortal sin.

Nor does it matter if a man having knowledge of a woman by fornication, make sufficient provision for the upbringing of the child: because a matter that comes under the determination of the law is judged according to what happens in general, and not according to what may happen in a particular case.

The Influence of Dance on Musical Styles of the 16th Century

Social dancing was widespread and highly valued in the Renaissance, and people of breeding were expected to be expert dancers. In addition to providing healthy exercise, dancing was a way to meet people, interact with them  in a formal setting, judge their fitness and social skills, and show off one's own abilities. With dancing a central part of social life, it is no surprise that musicians played and composed a great deal of dance music. In writing dance pieces, which owed little to vocal modes, sixteenth-century composers began to develop a distinctive instrumental style.

Performers frequently improvised dance music or played dance tunes from memory, as in earlier times. Several fifteenth-century manuscripts contain dances, typically in the form of bass lines over which treble instruments would improvise. But in the 16th century, many dance pieces were printed in collections issued by Petrucci, Attaingnant, and other publishers, for ensemble, lute or keyboard. These written works tell us much about improvisatory practice, showing that sixteenth-century performers often improvised by ornamenting a given melodic line or by adding one or more contrapuntal parts to a given melodic line or by adding one or more contrapuntal parts to a given melody or bass line

These published dances also show that dance music served two very different purposes in the Renaissance. Dances for ensemble were functional music, suitable for accompanying dancers, although they were also marketed to amateur performers. In these pieces, the principal melody is typically in the uppermost part, sometimes highly ornamented, but often left plain for the performer to add embellishments. The other parts are mostly homophonic, with little of no contrapuntal interplay. Most dance pieces for solo lute of keyboard, on the other hand, are stylized, intended for the enjoyment of the players or listeners rather than for dancing, and these often include more elaborate counterpoint or written-out decoration.
Each dance form has a particular meter, tempo, rhythmic pattern, and form which distinguishes each one from the others. Dance pieces feature two, or more distinct and repeated sections depending on the dance. Usually the phrase structure is clear and predictable, often in four-measure groups, so that dancers could follow it easily.

The favorite courtly dance of the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries was the basse danse, a stately couple dance marked by gracefully raising and lowering the body. It featured five different kinds of steps in various combinations. The music can be in triple or duple meter and is usually in six- or four- measure phrases. One example of a Basse danse is Tielman Susato's La Morisque  from his Danserye, which contains two repeated sections (binary form) in duple meter, each composed of a four measure phrase stated twice with different endings.
The Basse Danse was usually paired with a pavane, a slow dance in duple meter, and a galliard, a fast one in triple meter, on the same tune. Both had a form with three repeated strains (AABBCC). Similar pairings of dances in slow, then in fast meters was the passsamezzo and saltarello, which was popular in Italy.

Counter-Reformation: The Musical

As the Protestant Reformation spread, the Catholic Church responded with a series of initiatives, called the Counter-Reformation, made ever more pressing by the impending loss of England, the Netherlands, Germany, Austria, Bohemia, Poland and Hungary. Part of this counter-reformation included a purging of the abuses rampant in the Magesterium, which was initated by Pope Paul III. At the same time, St. Ignatius Loyola founded the Jesuits (The Society of Jesus), which established schools and taught doctrine among Protestants in Europe and non-Christians in Asia and the Americas. They were a major force of revitalization in Poland, France and Germany.

The Council of Trent (1545-1564), the formal response of the Church to the challenges posed to traditions and philosophies by the Protestants, did not compromises on matters of Faith and doctrine, but did pass regulations on the clergy meant to purge them of their abuses and excesses. Music, while only a small part of the discussion at Trent, had major ramifications for the liturgical practices of the Catholic world, and for all music history. The Council did state that  music should "keep away from...compositions in which there is an intermingling of the lascivious or impure, whether by instrument or by voice," but interpretation and application of this was left to the local bishops.

   Some argued strongly for the elimination of polyphony all together, deeming it unintelligible. Giovanni Pierluigi da Palestrina, according to legend, saved sacred polyphony through the composition of the Pope Marcellus Mass, a piece remarkable for its sophistication and clarity. Since Luther and Calvin called for simplified music, labeling polyphony as extravagant and papist, Palestrina is not given the title "the Savior of Music" for nothing.

In Spain, the Catholic community prospered, protected by the monarchy. The music of Spain became a major source of evangelization for the spread of Catholicism in the new world. The music of the Aztecs and Incas was a rich tradition mostly associated with dancing, and into this world the Spanish missionaries brought the masses of Morales, Victoria, Guerrero and Palestrina. While most of the works were sung in their original Spanish, may composers also wrote for local languages, such as Hanacpachap cussicuinin, a processional in the Quechua language of Peru.

The development of the motet from the late 14th century to the 15th century

Quam pulchra es ~ John Dunstable

If  Quam pulchra es had been written a century earlier, as a mostly homorhytmic setting of a Latin text, it could be classified as a cantilena, but in the fifteenth century it would be called a motet. This term, coined in the 13th century for pieces that added text to the upper part of a discant clausula, gradually broadened in meaning to include any work with texted upper voices above a cantus firmus with both sacred or secular text. By the early fifteenth century, the isorhythmic motet was an antiquated form, used for only the most formal of occasions, and by 1450 it fell out of fashion. Meanwhile, the term motet was applied to settings of liturgical texts in the newer musical styles of the time, whether or not a chant melody was used. The term came to designate almost any polyphonic composition on a Latin text, including settings of texts from the Mass Proper and the Office. It was even used for settings of Mass Ordinary texts before the mass cycle became its own genre around the mid-fifteenth century.

Ethics Midterm Study Guide.

Because Aquinas is crazy

1. What is genus, species, and differentia
1. Genus: What is predicated essentially of many things differing in a species
2. Species: different things belonging to the same genus
3. Differentia: that which separates a species from everything else in the genus
2. What are the four causes?
1. Formal Cause
2. Agent/ Efficient Cause
3. Material Cause
4. Final Cause
3. How do the four causes relate to ethics?
1. Formal Cause - the cause of the acts existence?
2. Agent Cause - The person who acts
3. Material Cause - the matter by which the person acts
4. Final cause - the reason for which the act is done
4. What are the three acts of the intellect?
1. Apprehension
2. Judgment
3. Reasoning
5. What does Aquinas mean by science?
1. Knowledge
6. How is ethics a science?
1. A practical science; a study of human action
7. What are the 12 components of a voluntary action?
1. Apprehend the good
2. Will the good
3. Judge the universal
4. Intend the good
5. Counsel
6. Consent
7. Judgment of means
8. Free choice
9. Command
10. Execution
11. Contemplation
12. Enjoyment
8. What is the relation between capacity, habit, act and object?
1. Our capacities allow us to act for some object, and doing so repeatedly is a habit
9. What are the various synonyms for capacity?
1. ability, potential, 
10. What are the various species of habits?
1. virtue
2. vice
11. what are the various synonyms for acts?
1. operation, execution, performance, transaction, accomplishment, consummation, achievement
12. What are the various capacities of humans?
1. grow, assimilate nutrition
2. reproduce
3. sensation
4. appetite
5. intellect
6. will
13. What are the capacities of animals?
1. growth, assimilate nutrition
2. reproduction
3. sensation
4. appetite
14. How is man a rational animal?
1. Come to know universals through reason
15. What does voluntary and involuntary mean?
1. voluntary - consent of the will
2. involuntary - without or contrary to the will
16. What did the word cardinal originally mean?
1. from the Latin word cardo, meaning hinge: all the other virtues revolve around these
17. What does the word virtue originally mean?
1. From the Latin word vir, meaning manly; denoting manly virtue
18. What are the four cardinal virtues?
1. Prudence
2. Justice
3. Temperance
4. Courage
19. Which part of the soul is prudence found in?
1. intellect
20. What does the word 'prudent' originally mean?
1. knowing, forseeing
21. What is the difference between practical and speculative reason?
1. practical - using truth as a means to an end
2. speculative - using truth for its own sake
22. What does Aquinas mean by science?
1. knowing
23. What does he mean by self evident?
1. that which is a necessary conclusion, needs no deductive  reason to come to
24. What is the difference between a universal and a particular?
1. Universal: that which applies to everything  in the species
2. Particular: a specific instance 
25. What is the role of prudence in relation to ends and means?
1. prudence illuminates for us the means deemed most appropriate for achieving antecedently established ends
26. Be able to give examples of ends and means
27. What is meant by a moral virtue?
1. those that perfect the appetitive powers of the soul
28. What is meant by a mean in moral virtues?
1. a balance between excess and lack, balance between extremes
29. What is meant by command?
1. The object of prudence, to direct subordinates in the right course of action
30. What is the difference between an individual and a common good?
1. An individual good has as its end the good of a specific person, whereas the common good has as its end the collective good of the many
31. What is meant by good counsel?
1. the research of reason to perform any particular act
32. What is meant by 'judging well according to common law'?
1. right judgment about particular practical matters
33. What is meant by 'judging well according to general law'?
1. right judgment according to higher principles than common sense
34. When is imprudence a sin?
1. When it is a negation, not a privation, i.e.  the movement or act of reason is in opposition to prudence, i.e. rejecting counsel. Mortal when it involves contempt and rejection of the Divine Law, but venial if acting beside the Law and without contempt and without detriment to things necessary for salvation
35. How/ why is lust a cause of imprudence?
1. because pleasure corrupts the operation of right reason
36. What is the difference between prudence of the flesh and craftiness?
1. Prudence of the flesh denotes a man who sees carnal goods as his final end
2. craftiness is the obtaining of an end, whether good or evil , through counterfeit means
37. How is right related to justice?
1. right is the object of justice
38. What are the two basic kinds of right?
1. Natural right
2. Positive right
39. What constitutes a natural right?
1. the law of equal returns, unchangeable
40. What is positive right?
1. a thing is adjusted or commensurated to a person by agreement or common consent
41. In which part of the soul does justice reside?
1. the will
42. How is justice a general virtue?
1. the good of any virtue is referable to the common good, which justice directs, so that all acts of virtue can pertain to justice, insofar as it directs the common good
43. How is justice a particular or special virtue?
1. A legal justice directs a man immediately to the good of another individual
44. What are the two species of justice
1. Distributive (whole in relation to its parts)
2. Commutative (part to part)
45. What is restitution?
1. To reinstate a person in the possession or dominion of his thing, must be given for salvation, giving back fully for the inequality, not just the amount, including giving what was not given in the first place
46. What does Aquinas mean by respect of person?
1. Respect of someone's position or office rather than their merits
47. Under what conditions is killing another person lawful?
1. Involuntary, so long as not negligent
2. self-defense, only so far as it is an unfortunate side-effect
3. Defence of the community or common good
4. justice executed by legitimate authority
48. What is Aquinas' argument for corporal punishment?
1. for the sake of the whole, a part may suffer, especially for its cure
49. What is the difference between theft and robbery?
1. Theft involves taking something in secret
2. Robbery involves taking something by violence
50. Which is worse?
1. robbery
51. What is calumny?
1. falsely charging a person with a crime
52. What are the three species of lying?
1. Jocose
2. Officious
3. Malicious
53. What is reviling?
1. The dishonoring of a person
54. What is backbiting?
1. Speaking against another's name secretly
55. What does Aquinas mean by tale-bearing?
1. Speaking evil of persons in order to sever relationships
56. What is derision?
1. Shaming a person with words
57. What does Aquinas mean by cursing?
1. to command or desire another's evil, as evil, being intent on the evil itself
58. Why does Aquinas think usury is wrong?
1. Usury is to sell what does not exist, because money is consumed by its use, and therfore there is an inequality in transaction, which is injustice
59. What is the difference between sins of omission and sins of transgression or commission?
1. A sin of omission is not doing what one ought to do, whereas a transgression is doing what one ought not to do
60. What does Aquinas mean by religion?
1. Offering service and ceremonial rites to a superior nature that men call divine
61. How is religion a natural phenomenon, rather than a part of special revelation?
1. Natural reason tells man that he is subject to a thing higher than himself on account of his personal defects. Naturally, anything superior deserves obeisance from that which is inferior
62. What is the difference between natural religion and revealed religion?
1. Natural religion uses public signs, philosophy and natural revelation, whereas revealed religion is given by God to private individuals and involves belief
63. What does Aquinas mean by prayer?
1. To ask becoming things of God, an act of reason
64. How is prayer efficacious?
1. By prayer we make ourselves able to receive what God has already deigned to give us (partial causality)
65. What are the two theological errors that one must avoid in discussion of prayer?
1. God can change His mind
2. Implying necessity on human affairs
66. What is meant by contingent?
1. That which could be otherwise
67. What is meant by necessary?
1. That which could not possibly be at all different
68. What does Aquinas mean by sacrifice?
1. Offering certain sensible signs to God in as a sign of the subjugation and honor due to Him
69. What does Aquinas mean to vow?
1. A binding to do or omit some particular thing
70. What is meant by an oath?
1. Calling God to bear witness to the Truth of a statement
71. Why is it necessary to invoke God as a witness?
1. because God is the source of all truth and knowledge

Beauty and Being according to Aquinas

 In the Summa Theologica, II-II Q. 145 Art. 2, St. Thomas Aquinas argues that honesty is synonymous with spiritual beauty. He explains his position by professing that “beauty or comeliness results from the concurrence of clarity and due proportion”[1], and “spiritual beauty consists in a man’s conduct or actions being well proportioned in respect of the spiritual clarity of reason. Now this is what is meant by honesty.”[2] Of these two aspects of beauty, clarity and proportion are easy to understand, but what does Aquinas mean when he calls beauty proportioned? The aim of this paper is to explore Aquinas’s belief that beauty is proportionate. To do this, one must first understand how Aquinas defines beauty by drawing on his previous writings. After this, a firm grasp of Aquinas’s understanding of proportion will be helpful to conclude what Aquinas implies when he claims that beauty consists of “due proportion.”

The first component in understanding Aquinas’s argument is to analyze what he understands to be the nature of beauty.  In I-I Q. 5 Art. 4, Aquinas states that “beautiful things are those that please when seen.”[3] Although he uses the Latin word “visa”, which implies seeing with the eyes, as opposed to “intellegere”, which means to comprehend, Aquinas does not refer to “visa” in regards to sensation or perception. Rather, Aquinas declares that “beauty relates to the cognitive faculty,”[4] that is, it is our intellect that responds to beauty. This does not imply that physical things do not partake in beauty, for Aquinas says that without perception there is no cognition. Rather, the phenomena of sensation, perception and cognition are unified in the experience of beauty. The experience of beauty is not purely disinterested aesthetics, nor is it sensualism, but a synthesis between the two, unifying the powers of the human person. Aquinas himself wrote many beautiful poems and hymns such as Adoro Te Devote, expressing through the beauty of poetry his spiritual convictions. Man delights in beautiful things for their own sake, though his delight is not a kind of delight that must be measured by moderation.

It is true that a virtue is a mean between extremes according to Aquinas, based on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, but one would never speak of mediocrity in virtue as being good.  There can be no excess of good or of virtue, only lack. In the same way, beauty is virtuous, for “if a thing is perceived to be beautiful as soon as it is apprehended, it is taken to be something becoming and good.”[5]  A saint is not honored for mediocrity in virtue, likewise, one should never pursue mediocrity in the pursuit of beauty, for “God is said to be beautiful, as being the cause of the harmony and clarity of the universe.”[6] In the pursuit of beauty, man pursues virtue itself, given that “honesty is the same as virtue”[7] and “the honest is the same as the beautiful.”[8] To an extent, all of creation is beautiful because it shares in the beauty of the divine essence, a state known to the Greeks as pankalia, the beauty of all things. Beauty as implied by Aquinas is therefore transcendental, and is not only synonymous with honesty but with all of virtue, as well as being a pursuit of the entire human person, body and soul, and should be pursued relentlessly.

Recalling that beauty results from the concurrence of clarity and due proportion, it is now fitting to analyze Aquinas’s understanding of proportion. “Beauty consists in due proportion; for the senses delight in things duly proportioned, as in what is after their own kind – because even sense is a sort of reason.”[9] A thing may be proportionate in two ways. In the first way, a thing can be proportionate to itself, as an arm is proportionate to a body or the blade of a sword is proportionate to the weight of its guard. In the second sense, a thing may be proportionate to a rule or principal, as positioning keys in a flute in order to harness the laws of acoustical physics, or the development of a child’s body according to the dictates of their biology. In both terms, Aquinas cannot mean mathematical proportion, or else one could not possibly speak of spiritual beauty, which can be spoken of in either sense. Perhaps, then, his measure is not mathematical, but rather expresses adherence to some sort of metaphysical form. If this is so, then proportion means participation in the divine essence, for every form participates in the brilliance of God. The natural law and the supernatural law are operations of God’s Wisdom, and to the extent to which one adheres to the workings of Wisdom, one participates in the Divine Nature. Harmony, or consonance between different persons, things or ideas, also finds its root in the hierarchy of all things bending to the supremacy of God. In this manner, beauty is consistent with the second meaning of proportion.

As stated above, beauty participates in the divine because God is Himself the source of all beauty. If beauty is indeed cognitive, then to pursue beauty is to pursue knowledge. This statement implies not just any knowledge, but knowledge of virtue and goodness, knowledge of wisdom, and finally knowledge of God.  Because beauty concerns itself with being, or existence, it concerns itself with forms, and therefore concerns itself with proportion. What the meaning of beauty as proportion is in application, however, may be obscure; one must measure beauty in a thing specific to its nature. One would not judge the beauty of a painting based on the same criteria as one would judge the beauty of the female form. Rather, proportion is specific to the thing, idea or spiritual quality. In this way, beauty is consistent with the first sense of proportion.

In conclusion, Aquinas’s condition that beauty be proportionate is nearly synonymous with his idea that beauty is that which pleases. Beauty is honest because it is proportionate, both with regard to itself and with regards to Divine Wisdom, and because it speaks with clarity about the nature and splendor of God. To be virtuous, or good, is to be beautiful, and therefore the virtuous life is appealing and desirable to the human person. To be honest also means to speak the truth, and therefore Aquinas sees a synthesis of truth, goodness and beauty. All of these are concerned with being and point directly to God who is Himself existence. Therefore, in the pursuit of beauty, one pursues God Himself.

---

[1] St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, vol. 3. Trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (New York: Benzinger Bros, 1948), 1774-5

[2] Ibid. 1774

[3] St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, vol. 1. Trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (New York: Benzinger Bros, 1948), 26

[4] Ibid. 26

[5] St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, vol. 3. Trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (New York: Benzinger Bros, 1948), 1775

[6] Ibid. 1774

[7] Ibid. 1773

[8] Ibid. 1774

[9] St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, vol. 1. Trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (New York: Benzinger Bros, 1948), 26

Poem of the Day

My Wandering Heart

My wandering heart is a curse

hanging as a chain about my neck,

A brand and a scar

which smolders beneath the skin

and which can have no balm

nor salve

but must sear me in silence

gritting my teeth in pain.

Oh what unspeakable sorrow walks

among my memories,

stirring the flame of rememberence,

that moment in the snow

when our bodies and our souls touched,

The warmth of your chest

and the pressure of your arms

and the eternity of your gaze

like the eternity of the skies above,

lost in the bitterness of restraint.

My longing for you is as a hole in my heart

which no forgetfulness can heal.

Your holiness is running water

to the parched desert of my soul

and I hear your voice in my dreams

like a call to prayer,

The cry of a seagull

who has lost the sea